Corporate Governance And Ownership Structure Report For Fy

"The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach to explain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on agency theory, corporate risk management theory, and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership-performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure-firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the 'missing links' in the ownership structure-firm performance relationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm's financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management, and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues"--

This book is a guide through the historical, legal and institutional background of corporate governance debates. It explains the three broad views on the relationship among the governance, performance, and competitiveness of corporations. Blair argues that the suspicion that financial interests may be at odds with social goals lurks behind some of the more heated debates, particularly those surrounding anti-takeover laws, executive compensation schemes, and the growing activism of financial institutions.

With contributions by distinguished scholars from legal and financial backgrounds, this collection of essays analyses four main topics in the corporate governance of European listed firms: (i) board structure, composition and functioning and their interaction with ownership structure; (ii) board remuneration; (iii) shareholder activism and (iv) corporate governance disclosure based on the 'comply or explain' approach. The authors provide new comparative evidence and analyse its implications for the policy debate. They challenge the conventional wisdom that corporate governance in European firms was systematically dysfunctional. While proposals aimed at increasing disclosure and accountability are usually well-grounded, caution is suggested when bringing forward regulatory changes with respect to proposals targeting specific governance arrangements, especially in the fields of board composition and shareholder activism. They argue that the 'comply or explain' principle should be retained and further efforts should be exercised to enhance disclosure.

This dissertation, "Corporate Governance in China's Listed Companies: Ownership Structure and Market Disciplines" by Li, Shao, ??, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. DOI:

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Corporate governance has become a household term and investors across the world are demanding more transparency and accountability from controllers of listed corporations. The current resources boom that has been driven by soaring demand from China has brought China's listed resources companies into focus. Some of these companies are beginning to be known internationally, such as Sinopec, PetroChina, CNOOC (in the oil industry) and CHALCO (aluminium); but their governance structures are often not well known. This book explores the corporate governance of these listed companies. Compared with the governance of global companies, such as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Shell, Shevron, the governance of China's resources companies has special characteristics. While the authors focus is on the governance of resources companies in China, this book also tackles contemporary issues of resource security and environmental change which are closely related to the depletion of the world's natural resources. Case studies of other international resources giants such as BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Shell and Chevron are provided to enhance our understanding of the differences that exist between them and Chinese resources companies. This book will be of interest to the business community and to those readers who are interested in China and its governance related issues.

This compilation serves a particularly useful purpose by presenting a full range of fascinating case studies. The editor thus enables each reader to assimilate the particulars in his own parlance, thus avoiding the almost insoluble problem of international corporate governance namely that each country uses the same words, but with utterly different meanings. Obviously, this problem has inhibited constructive conversation. After digesting these case studies, one is encouraged to derive certain generalized conclusions, among which are no matter what the terminology, the integrity of publicly traded securities depends on transparency and enforceable accountability of manager to owner. Robert Monks, Lens Governance Advisors, US This collection of thoroughly researched and well-written case studies of the governance of companies in nine countries demonstrates how far away we are from convergence in corporate governance systems. Differences in ownership structures, board composition, financial markets, accounting standards, takeover defences, legal systems, societal and corporate cultures, and even political involvement, are highlighted in this splendid collection. The book demonstrates the importance of the few core concepts that are emerging in the field, such as greater transparency, independence in non-executive directors, and the need for more effective governance. The consideration of case studies is presently the best way to understand the reality of corporate governance around the world. This book offers valuable insights to students, teachers and practitioners of the subject. R.I. (Bob) Tricker, Honorary Professor, University of Hong Kong and Founder Editor, Corporate Governance an international review Corporate governance has become a global phenomenon. This book highlights, through various case studies, how corporate governance has evolved in a number of countries around the world. The international cast of contributors, from varying professional backgrounds including academics, lawyers and company directors, focus on different regions around the globe, reflecting various ownership structures, legal systems, and political and cultural aspirations. Some of the case studies used include: Standard Life; Telecom Italia; and Eskom. Academics, directors and practitioners will find this book valuable for its insights into corporate governance developments in different legal environments and different business forms. It will also be immensely useful to postgraduate and undergraduate students for the up-to-date case studies on corporate governance, which will add depth and real world meaning to their studies.

Includes papers that focus upon corporate governance, defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. This work describes the design and control of effective organizations structure by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers.

Corporate governance remains a central area of concern to business and society, and this Handbook

constitutes the definitive source of academic research on this topic, synthesizing international studies from economics, strategy, international business, organizational behavior, entrepreneurship, business ethics, accounting, finance, and law.
Corporate governance reform is currently on the agenda in the European Union, the United States, Japan and in emerging market economies. This book takes a fresh look at the reform debate by focusing on the trade-offs involved in reconciling the diverging interests of shareholders, creditors and managers. It shows how effective corporate governance systems exploit complementarities between the incentives generated by the capital structure, the ownership structure, investor monitoring, takeover threats, and management compensation to minimize the sum of all agency costs facing the public corporation. The book combines a general theoretical treatment with a detailed study of the institutions of corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the United States and a critical assessment of recent reforms.
Corporate Governance Matters gives corporate board members, officers, directors, and other stakeholders the full spectrum of knowledge they need to implement and sustain superior governance. Authored by two leading experts, this comprehensive reference thoroughly addresses every component of governance. The authors carefully synthesize

current academic and professional research, summarizing what is known, what is unknown, and where the evidence remains inconclusive. Along the way, they illuminate many key topics overlooked in previous books on the subject. Coverage includes: International corporate governance. Compensation, equity ownership, incentives, and the labor market for CEOs. Optimal board structure, tradeoffs, and consequences. Governance, organizational strategy, business models, and risk management. Succession planning. Financial reporting and external audit. The market for corporate control. Roles of institutional and activist shareholders. Governance ratings. The authors offer models and frameworks demonstrating how the components of governance fit together, with concrete examples illustrating key points. Throughout, their balanced approach is focused strictly on two goals: to “get the story straight,” and to provide useful tools for making better, more informed decisions.

Do corporate governance practices affect firm performance? Are shareholders willing to pay a premium for higher governance standards? How does the ownership structure of a firm affect its corporate governance practices and firm performance? This book investigates whether differences in the quality of firm-level corporate governance affects firm performance. Constructing a broad corporate governance index for listed Turkish companies, it is documented that there is a

positive relationship between governance scores and Tobin's Q as a measure for firm performance. Firms with better corporate governance scores in the model used in this book have higher firm values, which implies that firms can increase shareholder value by restructuring their corporate governance standards. The analysis also sheds light on the impact of ownership structure on stock performance. Listed companies withhigher corporate governance scores and higher foreign ownership ratios experienced a smaller reduction in their share prices during the equity market crash in Turkey parallel to the global equity markets between 2008 and 2009.
'Throughout the world there is conflict between the desire to reap wealth from strong corporate functioning and the imperative of preserving the integrity of the sovereign state. Christine Mallin has assembled a collection of delightful essays describing the current circumstances of corporate governance in a variety of different countries. The volume reads like a story, fascinating, accessible and informative. The book can be read for information in each article or as a totality giving insight into the critical balancing of interests required in particular countries. Anyone buying this book – and you should – will have a fine experience.' – Robert Monks, Lens Governance Advisors, US The second edition of this major Handbook provides a thoroughly revised and extensive analysis of the development of corporate governance across a broad range of countries including Australia, China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey and the UK. Additional coverage in this second edition includes

Brazil, Hungary, Malaysia, and Norway. The Handbook reveals that whilst the stage in the corporate governance life cycle may vary from country to country, there are certain core features that emerge such as the importance of transparency, disclosure, accountability of directors and protection of minority shareholders' rights. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners in the field of corporate governance, this important Handbook provides a comprehensive insight into the evolution of corporate governance in countries with diverse cultural, economic and legal systems.

The last Asian financial crisis, coupled with the western series of corporate scandals, has caused investors and citizens to doubt mangers’ ability to guarantee credible financial information about organizations. Consequently, legislators all over the world have come to realise the necessity of legislating in the area of corporate governance. This book explores several national corporate governance reform experiences from around the world (including Canada, China, the United States, and the European Union) and offers an explanatory theory with regard to national systems of corporate governance. It also underlines corporate governance as a management tool and principle. The author argues that each country should be encouraged to build its own system of corporate governance which should be harmonized with its history, culture and the level of its economic development.

My dissertation explores the leading role of ownership structures in corporate governance for publicly traded firms in emerging markets. I analyze the relationships between ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, firm value and market liquidity for a sample of Latin American firms. The predominant highly concentrated ownership within a context of weak shareholder protection provides a rich environment to explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. The period of analysis, 2000-2006, is characterized by economic growth sustained by the expansion of foreign direct investment in a post-privatization era. The region as a whole, rather than just individual markets, became an attractive investment destination. In addition the development of a private pension system initiated in Chile and subsequently expanded to more than 25 countries (the AFP system) reinvigorated the capital markets which have become more attractive as a means of diversification for global portfolios. Moreover, understanding the implications of concentrated ownership structures is fundamental for participants in a yet incipient mergers and acquisitions market. My dissertation consists of three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my research approach and understanding of the topic and they all benefit from the exploitation of a unique ownership database. This work serves to advance the finance literature in several dimensions: a) the manuscript examines at markets which have hitherto been ignored or at best simply characterized as having very weak governance structures; b) it addresses endogeneity problems from the initial design of this research project through the data collection process; c) furthermore, I extend the literature on the interactions between governance mechanisms and firm value; and d) it develops new corporate governance measures, including novel "effective" firm ownership variables for these markets. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be attributable to discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I examine the extent to which dominant shareholders can divert resources for their own consumption, in turn reducing overall shareholder value. Given the large potential for private consumption, by the dominant shareholders, I also explore the motivations for outside investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities. Concentrated ownership is perceived as an inefficient form of ownership because it allegedly increases the risk of minority expropriation, which is further exacerbated by the disproportionality of control and cash-flow rights of the controller. This thesis challenges the perception of concentration as a per se inefficient ownership structure. It argues that the 'inefficiency bias' is based on the oversimplified, incorrect assumption that concentration is characterised by the presence of one controlling shareholder and therefore disregards the variety of the forms of concentration. To substantiate this argument, this thesis categorises the forms of concentration based on the identity and number of the controllers and examines their impact on corporate governance. It is shown, that the distinct characteristics of the varieties of shareholders' profiles have an ambivalent impact on corporate governance: Families are strongly committed investors but also prone to extract private benefits of control; the state is inefficient in monitoring but can also be a driver of good corporate governance practices; multiple large shareholders improve internal contestability of control but shareholders' agreements can also be used for minority expropriation. In this context, the effectiveness of the legal framework to mitigate the arising corporate governance problems becomes the key factor which differentiates efficient from inefficient corporate ownership structures. The different corporate governance problems of concentration imply that adapted legal solutions and adequately flexible rules are the prerequisites of effective investor protection. Given the varieties of concentration, legal effectiveness and strong investor protection can therefore only be defined by reference to a given ownership structure. This thesis presents concrete examples of investor protection mechanisms which are adapted to the distinct characteristics of the varieties of concentration: In the case of family and state ownership, effective minority protection takes the form of special minority rights of board-representation; within multiple large blockholdings, shareholders' agreements limit the abuse of the governance rights of majority shareholders. Ultimately, the thesis deals with the implications of this complex interaction between ownership structures and corporate governance which compromise the reliability of indices as a metric of the quality of corporate governance, to the extent that the applied methodology fails to encompass the differences in shareholders' profiles and that a functional approach to the substantive legal analysis preceding the compilation of an index is not adopted. This publication examines the role of corporate governance arrangements in providing right incentives to contribute the value creation process within the private enterprises and the implications of the differences in ownership structures on corporate governance practices and frameworks.

June 1997 Does the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in China affect their performance? Yes. Institutional shareholders seem to have a positive impact on corporate governance and performance; state ownership seems to lead to inefficiency; and an overly dispersed ownership structure can create problems in the Chinese setting. Xu and Wang investigate whether ownership structure significantly affects the performance of publicly listed firms in China and if so, in what way. With public listed stocks, one can quantify the ownership mix and concentration, which makes it possible to study this issue. The authors use the recent literature on the role of large institutional shareholders in corporate governance as a theoretical base. A typical listed stock company in China has a mixed ownership structure, with three predominant groups of shareholders- state, legal persons (institutions), and individuals- holding about 30 percent of the stock. (Employees and foreign investors together hold less than 10 percent.) Ownership is heavily concentrated: the five largest shareholders accounted for 58 percent of outstanding shares in 1995, compared with 57.8 percent in the Czech Republic, 42 percent in Germany, and 33 percent in Japan. Their empirical analysis shows that the mix and concentration of stock

ownership do indeed significantly affect a company's performance: * There is a positive, significant correlation between concentration of ownership and profitability. * The effect of concentrated ownership is greater with companies dominated by institutions than with those dominated by the state. * The firms' profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of legal person (institutional) shares; it is either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and with tradable A-shares held mostly by individuals. * Labor productivity tends to decline as the proportion of state shares increases. This paper- product of the Office of the Director, Economic Development Institute- part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand and disseminate various models of corporate governance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm's Performance (RPO 681-08).
'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in

several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.

This book explores discussions and practice around corporate governance in Russia from the early 1990s until 2018. It covers three major aspects of corporate governance theory and practice: a vision of corporate governance in Russia in the context of global trends and challenges, the general perception of corporate governance in Russia, and the real nature of Russia's corporate community from the viewpoint of its corporate governance practices. It provides a unique complex analysis and detailed description of how corporate governance has been perceived by both Russian regulators and the business community, and how it has been applied in Russian companies. This analysis covers the period of over 25 years: from early attempts at directing transfer and implanting the Western model of corporate governance to the nascent Russian big private business, up to the period of resurgence of the state as the dominant player both in Russian society and its economy at large. It gives an understanding of what corporate governance is in Russia in the days of "sovereign democracy" and confrontation with the West. It explains how cultural, political, economic and institutional factors have shaped corporate governance in Russia. The authors provide insights into such aspects of Russian corporate governance framework and practices as regulatory philosophy and enforcement, ownership structure, the role of the state, the impact of unfriendly domestic business climate, how the value of corporate governance is perceived in Russian context, etc. Predominantly, the book paints an interesting picture of how the "sovereign corporate governance" model has been shaped in Russia. This book will be useful not just for experts in corporate governance and investors, but also for those who have an interest in modern Russia at large.

This book carefully examines the effects of changes in the corporate governance structure on corporate behavior or company performance, using micro-data from listed companies in Japan. The author found that in Japan the introduction of stock options had neither a positive impact on profitability nor the negative side effects of promoting risk-taking behaviors. Furthermore, he found that corporate diversification and division of corporations showed negative impacts on profitability. The corporate governance structure of Japan has exhibited a large change from the second half of the 1990s to the present. There have been institutional reforms involving enterprise law, such as the introduction of stock options and the removal of the ban on holding companies. With respect to the ownership structure of a company, discernible trends are that the equity holdings of financial institutions and business corporations have fallen while the presence of foreign stockholders has risen. These trends are often pointed out as signs that the Japanese corporate governance structure has been approaching the American model and that this will energize Japanese firms. The author contradicts common academic theories, however, and concludes that the formation of the corporate governance which emphasizes the agency problem between shareholders and corporate managers is inadequate. He suggests that an institutional arrangement for a corporate governance system that values a variety of stakeholders' interests is greatly needed and concludes that perspectives on maximizing surplus values for various stakeholders and distributing the surpluses appropriately among the stakeholders will become increasingly important for the purpose of managing corporations.

Takes readers through an in-depth examination of many leading industrialized nations and identifies both the drivers that propel corporations towards convergence and the major impediments that stand in the way of convergence. Also examines many mechanisms of convergence such as governance codes, MNCs, and IPOs.

The decade since the publication of the Cadbury Report in1992 has seen growing interest in corporate governance. This growth has recently become an explosion with major corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron in the US, the international diffusion of corporate governance codes and wider interest in researching corporate governance in different institutional contexts and through different subject lenses. In view of these developments, this book will be a rigorous update and development of the editor’s earlier work, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues. Each chapter, written by an expert in the subject offers a high level review of the topic, embracing material from financial accounting, strategy and economic perspectives.

The unusual feature of this book is that it compares the system of corporate governance operating in Australia with that operating in the UK, while at the same time also looking carefully at US, German and Japanese experiences. The significance of the subject matter of this book lies in the fact that institutional investors collectively hold a very large proportion of the equity capital of the UK corporate sector and a sizeable proportion of the equity capital of the Australian equivalent. In addition domestic companies occupy an extremely significant position in the UK economy and a significant one in the Australian economy.

Intermediate Examination Paper from the year 2009 in the subject Business economics - Miscellaneous, grade: 1,2, University of St Andrews, language: English, abstract: Corporate Governance (CG) has always been a critically viewed topic and is being increasingly discussed after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, which had a worldwide outreach (Petra, 2006, p. 107) or major cases of poor corporate governance in Asia such as the Peregrine or the CA Pacific Securities Case in the 1990s. On this account, stricter rules have been introduced and existing regulations were re-examined in many markets in order to restore the public confidence in corporate governance systems and the transparency and accountability of organisations. The corporate governance system in Hong Kong is characterised by unique features differing from the Anglo-American framework. The extensive amount of family-controlled companies and mainland firms would suggest a deficient corporate governance system. In spite of this, a study by Nan, Kang and Kim (1999) comparing corporate governance among Asian economies indicated that Hong Kong has significantly higher corporate governance standards and equally more sophisticated legal systems governing the protection of property rights than other countries in that area. As regard to the structure of this coursework, initially, the general theoretic foundations of corporate governance are explained in chapter two. Thereafter, the specifics of the market in Hong Kong will be examined, comparing the development of global corporate governance to the development in Hong Kong. It is also explained why transplanted British and American laws and regulations seem ineffective. Chapter 4.1 then analyses the composition of shareholders in Hong Kong, answering the question as to why there is only a small number of minority shareholders actively participating in corporate governance. In chapter 4.2, it will be discussed whether minority shareholders are successful in confronti

A detailed look at the importance of corporate governance in today's business world The importance of corporate governance became dramatically clear at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a series of corporate meltdowns from managerial fraud, misconduct, and negligence caused a massive loss of shareholder wealth. As part of the Robert W. Kolb Series in Finance, this book provides a comprehensive view of the shareholder-manager relationship and examines the current state of governance mechanisms in mitigating the principal-agent conflict. This book also offers informed suggestions and predictions about the future direction of corporate governance. Relies on recent research findings to provide guidance through the maze of theories and concepts Uses a structured approach to put corporate governance in perspective Addresses essential issues related to corporate governance including the idea of principal-agent conflict, role of the board of directors, executive compensation, corporate monitoring, proxy contests and corporate takeovers, and regulatory intervention Corporate governance is an essential part of mainstream finance. If you need to gain a better understanding of this topic, look no further than this book.